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TOWARDS ANOTHER PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM: FASCISTIZATION AS A PRODUCTION OF NORMOPATHY

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Abstract

This article outlines a critical proposal for a psychological approach to far-right movements, particularly fascism and neo-fascism, to elucidate their origin in the process of fascisation conceived as the production of normopathy. After questioning the works that seek to psychopathologize far-right leaders and groups by presenting them as abnormal, we argue in favour of the recognition of their increasingly normal character, explaining it by the conjunctural fact of rightisation and by the structural factor of the banality of evil. It is shown how this normalization and normality of pathology entails a pathology of normality whose antisocial or psychopathic version is described as normopathic and is associated with the socioeconomic system of capitalism and its fascist and neo-fascist political drifts. Normopathy, illustrated by German Nazism and its continuation through a certain extreme form of Israeli Zionism, is defined as a problem of normativity that is political, not psychological, and that should not therefore be psychologized and thus depoliticized.

Descriptors: Psychology of fascism; Extreme right; Fascisation; Normality; Normopathy.

RUMO A OUTRA PSICOLOGIA DO FASCISMO: A FASCISTIZAÇÃO COMO PRODUÇÃO DA NORMOPATIA

Resumo: Este artigo traça uma proposta crítica de abordagem psicológica dos movimentos de extrema direita, particularmente o fascismo e o neofascismo, para elucidar a sua origem no processo de fascistização concebido como a produção da normopatia. Depois de questionarmos os trabalhos que procuram psicopatologizar líderes e grupos de extrema-direita apresentando-os como anormais, argumentamos a favor do reconhecimento do seu carácter cada vez mais normal, explicando-o pelo facto conjuntural da direitização e pelo fator estrutural da banalidade do mal. Mostra-se como esta normalização e normalidade da patologia acarreta uma patologia da normalidade cuja versão antissocial ou psicopática é descrita como normopática e está associada ao sistema socioeconómico do capitalismo e às suas derivas políticas fascistas e neofascistas. A normopatia, ilustrada pelo nazismo alemão e a sua continuação através de uma certa forma extrema de sionismo israelita, é definida como um problema de normatividade que é político, não psicológico, e que não deve, portanto, ser psicologizado e despolitizado.

Descritores Psicologia do fascismo; Extrema direita; Fascistização; Normalidade; Normopatia.

HACIA OTRA PSICOLOGÍA DEL FASCISMO: FASCISTIZACIÓN COMO PRODUCCIÓN DE NORMOPATÍA

Resumen: El presente artículo esboza una propuesta crítica de acercamiento psicológico al fascismo y al neofascismo para elucidar su origen en una fascistización concebida como producción de normopatía. Después de cuestionarse trabajos en los que se psicopatologiza a líderes y grupos ultraderechistas al presentarlos como anormales, se argumenta a favor del reconocimiento de su carácter cada vez más normal, explicándolo por el hecho coyuntural de la derechización y por el factor estructural de la banalidad del mal. Se muestra cómo esta normalización de la patología entraña una patología de la normalidad cuya versión psicopática se describe como normopática y se asocia con el capitalismo y con sus derivas políticas fascistas y neofascistas. La normopatía, ilustrada con el nazismo alemán y con su continuación a través de cierto sionismo israelí, se define como un problema de normatividad que es político, no psicológico, y que no debe por ello psicologizarse y así despolitizarse.

Descriptoros: Psicología del fascismo; Ultraderecha; Fascistización; Normalidad; Normopatía.

INTRODUCTION

The Argentinean ultra-right-wing leader Javier Milei showed possible signs of insanity in a television program. Immediately, in the media and in social networks, his compatriots rushed to diagnose him with psychosis, paranoia and schizophrenia. His mental health problems were evident to his opponents and corroborated the conviction of many of them that the ultra-right is a form of disorder, of psychopathology.

The psychopathologization of the ultra-right is widespread and quite understandable: how can we fail to understand those who psychopathologize such apparently irrational phenomena as

racism, ultra-nationalism, xenophobia, supremacism, conspiracy-mongering, sexism and homophobia? Psychopathologizing all this is a quick, simple and infallible way to invalidate it by accentuating and explaining its irrationality, explaining it as a pathology of reason resulting from a mental pathology.

The problem is that psychopathologizing allows us to invalidate for the sake of invalidating, without arguing, without giving good reasons to invalidate. This is how we can get rid of that which seems irrational to us simply because it is something we do not agree with, that we do not understand or do not tolerate, that irritates or distresses us. If we are not prepared to listen to a certain truth, what prevents us from labeling those who utter it as crazy? We can also consider all our political adversaries as deranged, just as they will also have the right to see us as insane.

In fact, psychopathologization has been used more than once by the ultra-right to disqualify the left. Already in the 1930's and 1940's, the Spanish Francoist psychiatrist Antonio Vallejo Nájera described the psychopathological picture of Marxism, diagnosed it and treated it for the purpose of cure.¹ Today, the Chilean ultra-right Axel Kaiser continues to conceive Marxism as a mental disorder.²

If the ultra-right psychopathologizes us, why should we not have the right to do so? Why forbid us again to do what fascists and neo-fascists do? Do we not give them the advantage over us by imposing limits on us that they never imposed?

In the precise case at hand, psychopathologizing the ultra-rightists would at least serve to raise the concrete possibility that they themselves might be suffering from the mental incapacity they attribute to everyone else. Psychopathologizing the ultra-right could also give us some peace of mind. We would be reassured, in fact, to conclude that occurrences such as fascist and neo-fascist ones are delusional, that we should neither take them seriously nor much less try to prove their falsity, that it is enough to dismiss them and discard them like any other delirium, without worrying too much about them, since in any case, like any psychopathology, they are rarities, irregularities, exceptions to the norm, abnormal cases that it is enough to treat and cure by folding them into normality.

The slide into the normal/abnormal dichotomy is characteristic of modern approaches to the healthy/pathological duality. By representing psychopathology to us as an abnormality, the psychopathologization of the ultra-right becomes a kind of *abnormalization*. This abnormalization

increases the attractiveness of a psychopathologization that no longer serves only to disqualify fascism and neo-fascism as forms of insanity, but to disregard them as an exceptional, rare, minority phenomena.

NORMALITY OF THE ULTRA-RIGHT

Now, even if the psychopathologization of a far-right conceived as abnormal may reassure us, the fact is that it does not correspond to a historical reality. History shows us, in fact, that the fascist or neo-fascist masses and their leaders have **not** exactly been abnormal. On the contrary, they have generally been normal, even too normal, not suffering from any mental illness identified as such in their context. Even the most obviously singular case and the one that has given rise to most speculation, that of Adolf Hitler, does not present a clear identifiable pathology on which there is consensus among various diagnosticians.

Between World War I and World War II, Edmund Forster and Karl Wilmann reportedly diagnosed Hitler with hysteria.³ This diagnosis was also admitted by the team led by Walter C. Langer in 1943.⁴ In the same year, Henry Murray considered the Führer to have all the symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia, such as hypersensitivity, panic attacks, irrational jealousy, delusions of persecution and grandeur, fantasies of omnipotence, and belief in a messianic mission.⁵ These symptoms led many others to accept the same diagnosis, among them Edleff Schwaab in 1992.⁶ Other authors, from Gustav Bychowski in 1948⁷ to Frederic L. Coolidge, Felicia L. Davis and Daniel L. Segal in 2007,⁸ have believed to find in Hitler a case of psychopathy or antisocial or narcissistic personality disorder. In addition to these, the Nazi leader has also been diagnosed with other pathologies, such as borderline personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, schizotypal disorder, abnormal brain lateralization, bipolar disorder and even Asperger's syndrome.

Needless to say, the overwhelming number of different and contradictory nosological categories attributed to Hitler does not confirm his pathology, but rather the imperfection, inaccuracy and abuses of psychiatrists and psychologists who have only managed to refute and thus give each other away in their diagnoses of the case. These diagnoses, in effect, are mutually exclusive. Trusting them therefore forces us to distrust them. This is often the case with such inaccurate scientific or pseudoscientific specialties as psychology and psychiatry.

As long as Hitler's disorder has not been demonstrated, we must accept him as a normal subject. All the more reason we have to admit the normality of other analogous leaders as ordinary, as conventional, as Benito Mussolini or Francisco Franco in the past and Donald Trump or Jair Bolsonaro in the present. Never mind that these leaders have already received multiple diagnoses, such as bipolar for Mussolini, split personality for Franco, narcissistic personality disorder for Trump and paranoid personality disorder for Bolsonaro. No doubt these labels are suggestive and capture characteristic aspects of each case, but each case has other aspects captured by other labels, while all labels could be combined in different ways to characterize many ordinary people around us.

The diagnoses of the great leaders of the far right are often whimsical, arbitrary, and unfounded. It doesn't seem that these diagnoses reveal anything to us that we don't already know, except perhaps our fear of recognizing the chilling evidence that Mussolini, Franco, Trump, and Bolsonaro have not exactly been unhinged monsters, raging madmen whom we could have committed to psychiatric hospitals. Rather, they have been terrifyingly normal, ordinary, gray, perhaps even mediocre beings, surely not very different from any of us, at most as abnormal as any of the beings around us that we judge normal.

If the leaders of the ultra-right tend to be quite normal, those who follow them tend to be even more normal, thus being able to constitute immense crowds like those that brought to power Mussolini, Franco, Trump and Bolsonaro. Fascists, Nazis and Phalangists, like today's neo-Nazis and neo-Fascists, make up large sectors of the world's population, sometimes even becoming majorities that win elections. In this case, they constitute the norm and normality, the center of the normal distribution, which is disconcerting and worrying, since the extreme right, precisely because it is extreme, should not be in the center, at the top of the Gaussian bell.

RIGHT-WINGERS AND THE BANALITY OF EVIL

There is a sort of normalization of the extreme right. This normalization seems to reveal both a conjunctural fact and a structural phenomenon. The historical conjunctural fact is the ongoing right-wingization, which some confuse with polarization.⁹ The truth is that, since the 1980's, the ultra-right is the only option that polarizes, the only pole that strengthens and moves away from the center, becoming more and more extreme and attractive, while the radical left tends to weaken, moderate and center itself, with today's communism aspiring to what once aspired to the socialists and leftist populists, who, today, hardly coincide with the centrists of yesterday.

In addition to the right-wing as a conjunctural fact, we have the structural fact that Hannah Arendt described with the famous formula of the **banality of evil**, referring to the evil of Nazism, of what underlies it and the ultra-right in general.¹⁰ This evil is the banal, the most frequent, the normal, thus being at the top of the Gaussian bell. The top is not then what we usually believe, it is not the moral mediocrity that is between good and evil, but rather it is the evil that is perhaps between the worst and the mediocre. Hence, we cannot speak of a banality of good as we speak of a banality of evil.

Let us insist that structurally, structurally and not only conjuncturally, the banal or normal is not the good, but the evil of which Arendt speaks. It is the evil that underlies Nazism and neo-Nazism, fascism and neo-fascism, fascism therefore eternal as in Umberto Eco, eternal because structural and not only historical, but also eternally dominant because structurally normal, banal, ordinary.¹¹ Does this pessimistic anthropological vision not seem to be confirmed by famous experiments such as those of Stanley Milgram¹² and Philip Zimbardo?¹³

NORMALITY OF PATHOLOGY

It seems that Milgram and Zimbardo demonstrate experimentally the banality of evil. What they show us, eliminating the valuational element, is the normality of pathology, that is, the frequent and habitual character of what is usually considered pathological.

Pathology should be understood here in the etymological sense of the term, that of what is related to suffering, to what is suffered. It is the precise sense of the Greek *pathos* that also gives rise to the concept of **passion**, as in Descartes' passions of the soul.¹⁴ The passions can be conceived as the origin of pathology, distinguished from the current emotions of psychology precisely because they consist of something that is only suffered by the subject, not being its source, its agent or its creator. The subject is then the victim of his passions that make him ill, that upset him, that alienate him, plunging him into a pathology that suddenly reveals itself to us as normal.

There is then an element of normality in the passions that are associated with disorders such as psychopathic and antisocial disorders. Such disorders are considered rare, infrequent, but in reality they can be found in broad layers of the population, as we know from Milgram and Zimbardo. What these social psychologists have taught us is the normality of a pathology such as that of Nazism and today's ultra-right Zionism, i.e., the normal character of destructive and deadly

passions that are not then exclusive to the few psychopaths and sociopaths correctly diagnosed as such.

Milgram and Zimbardo show us the normality of passions such as some of those that Robert Paxton¹⁵⁽⁴¹⁾ has described as the “mobilizing passions” of fascism, particularly the passionate exaltation of violence or the equally passionate conviction of the right to dominate others unrestrained by any human or divine law.¹⁵ These devastating passions not only animate isolated psychopaths, antisocial individuals, but mobilize large masses, armies and governments, as we saw once in Germany and as we are seeing right now in Israel. Netanyahu and Hitler, like Bolsonaro and Mussolini, are just individual expressions of normal pathologies as demonstrated by Milgram and Zimbardo.

PATHOLOGY OF NORMALITY

By demonstrating the normality of pathology, Milgram and Zimbardo are almost imperceptibly evidencing something much more serious and disturbing, which is what Erich Fromm¹⁶ described with the expression of “pathology of normality”, understanding it, according to his own terms, as the “pathology” of “contemporary Western society”⁽¹³⁾, an “unhealthy society”, a society lacking “mental equilibrium”.¹⁶⁽⁶⁶⁾ We see that Fromm emphasizes the historical rather than the structural aspect, but in any case, his pathology of normality corresponds to a more serious, more fundamental and determining phenomenon than a simple normality of pathology. It is not only that pathology can be normal, but that normality can be pathological. In other words, it is possible not only to be ordinary and at the same time to be disturbed or deranged, but to be disturbed or deranged precisely because one is ordinary.

There is the possibility, then, that it is normality that disturbs us, that unhinges us, that drives us mad. In this case, to be sick, it is enough to be normal, since being normal is a form of being sick. In a correlative way, in order not to be sick, in order to be healthy, it would be necessary to be abnormal, since the pathological becomes the normal in a certain place and moment of history.

When the historical pathology of normality takes on a clearly psychopathic or antisocial tone, we can then designate it with the eloquent term **normopathy**, which was used successively by Joseba Atxotegui in the Basque Country in 1982,¹⁷ by Enrique Guinsberg in Mexico in 1994¹⁸ and by Christophe Dejours¹⁹ in France in 1998. The term had already been proposed by

Joyce McDougall in 1978, but without giving it the precise socio-political meaning that it acquires with Atxotegui, Guinsberg and Dejours. It is this sense that interests us and which allows us to use it to name not only a banality of evil such as Arendt finds in the Nazi Adolf Eichmann, but the evil of banality, i.e. the fact that the banal can be evil.

Normopathy designates a psychopathy or radical evil inherent in a certain historical normality. This psychopathic normality is ours, that of our place and moment in history, the same for Atxotegui as for Guinsberg and Dejours. For the latter two, it is the psychopathic normality of capitalism in its late neoliberal phase, in which we see the current neo-fascist drifts appearing. Similarly, for Atxotegui, the psychopathic historical normality is that which is revealed in the Zionist brutality of Israel with which the Nazi brutality of the Germany of the Third Reich returns.

Both Atxotegui and Guinsberg and Dejours situate normopathy in their present which is still ours. Atxotegui also has the merit of explaining the normopathy of the present by that of the past. His explanation is based on the testimony of the Jewish psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim²⁰ about his experience in the concentration camps of Dachau and Buchenwald.

ZIONIST NORMOPATHY

Bettelheim identifies a moment of total assimilation to the environment. This moment is the one in which the prisoners, as Sándor Ferenczi would say, identified with their aggressors. Suddenly Jews were insulting each other with anti-Semitic vocabulary, getting pieces of SS uniforms and proudly exhibiting them, squaring up like Nazis, imitating their poses, games and practices, and adopting their values to the point of torturing and killing fellow misfits.

It is hard to resist the hypothetical idea that the unconscious identification of the Jewish victims with their Nazi aggressors, as described by Bettelheim, would have begun in the concentration camps and would later be prolonged in the very constitution of present-day Israeli Zionism, which, in a way, would continue to play the roles of the SS and the Gestapo. Israel would then be constituted not only consciously from the legitimate aspiration of the Jewish people to have a land of their own, but unconsciously from an identification with the Third Reich by which Israel as a genocidal State would have that Nazi tonality that is becoming increasingly evident. As early as 1982, Joseba Atxotegui put forward this hypothesis by observing how the normopathy of Israeli Zionism, its normal psychopathy today denounced by an important part of the Jewish people, reproduced the same practices of the normopathy of German Nazism.

Like the Nazis of Germany in relation to the Jews, the present Zionists of Israel despise and animalize the Palestinians, segregate and exterminate them, liquidate by the thousands their children and women without any mercy, rob them of their lands and other property, confine them in huge ghettos and concentration camps like the one in the Gaza Strip. White or white-washed Israeli anti-Semitism directed against the Palestinians, the only true “Semites” of the present, is not much different from the Aryan German anti-Semitism once directed against the Jews. Just as the Third Reich sought a final solution to the Jewish problem, so too the Israeli government today desperately seeks a final solution to the Palestinian problem.

Of course, terrorist groups such as Hamas have already taken up the violent baton, perhaps reproducing the same identification with the aggressor, unconsciously identifying themselves with their Zionist aggressors as they would identify with their Nazi aggressors. This is how normopathy, according to Atxotegui, would be transmitted from generation to generation, preparing future catastrophes, unforeseeable holocausts like the one happening right now in the Gaza Strip.

Today the Palestinians are the undisputed victims of the Zionists as yesterday the Jews were the undisputed victims of the Nazis. It must be insisted that many Germans fought against murderous Nazism just as many Jews and Israelis now protest against genocidal Zionism, but it must also be recognized that for now, at least for now, the primary victimizers are still the Zionists and not the Muslim terrorists, and that the primary and majority victims are still the Palestinians and not the Israelis. To deny something so simple and obvious, as so many are denying it right now, is already a scoundrel, but a generalized scoundrel, a normal psychopathy, a form of normopathy like that incurred by those who pretended that the German Aryans were victims of the Jews or at least as much victims as they were at the time of the Holocaust.

POLITICAL AND NOT PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM

When thinking about the normopathy of the Zionists of the present or the Nazis of the past, the most important thing is to understand that the fundamental problem is not in the psychic constitution of the subjects governed by the norm, but in the norm that governs them and thus constitutes them psychically. The fundamental problem is, then, normative, related to normativity, to the political determination of norms. The problem of normopathy is political and not psychological. We must not, therefore, psychologize it and thus depoliticize it. To do so would be to proceed like Vallejo-Nájera or Kaiser in their grotesque attempts to psychopathologize Marxists.

This psychopathologization of the political adversary cannot be the solution because it is itself part of the problem of the normopathy of fascism and neo-fascism.

One of the distinctive features of ultra-right normopaths is precisely their propensity to depoliticize the battlefield of politics by the most diverse means, including psychologization and psychopathologization. It is common for ultra-rightists to see only a conflict between people or models of humanity, with their respective psychological profiles, where in reality there is a historical struggle between opposing political programs with their social and economic implications. This struggle is staged, theatricalized, made up and disguised by a personalization and personal stigmatization that are part of the arsenal of the typically fascist **aestheticization of politics** of which Walter Benjamin spoke.²¹

Fascist and neo-fascist aestheticization can make use of psychologization and psychopathologization as it can also resort to other means, among them moralization and what Emilio Gentile describes as the **sacralization of politics**.²² In all cases, politics ceases to appear as such, as what it is, and becomes ideologized, disguising itself by the very gesture by which it pretends to be something else, be it religion, morality, psychology or psychopathology. The psychological and psychopathological simulacrum reduces opposing class interests and their antagonistic political manifestations to simple aesthetic dichotomous distinctions between the developed and the degenerated, between the healthy and the sick, between the normal and the abnormal.

It is also in order to question and problematize dichotomies such as normality-abnormality or health-disease that we need concepts such as normopathy. This concept should allow us to cross the aesthetic appearance of psychology and psychopathology, of normality and abnormality as psychological states, to investigate how they derive from a political process of normalization that can produce fascism and neo-fascism, implying then a fascistization, when it consists in the normalization of certain psychopathy, in the trivialization of certain evil, of evils such as ultranationalism, racism, machismo, heterosexism, homophobia, xenophobia or Islamophobia, among others. Needless to say that the definition of these evils as such, as psychopathic expressions, obeys a political positioning and not a supposedly scientific research in the psychological and psychopathological field.

FASCISTIZATION

Psychology and psychopathology should not be used either to define the normopathic picture or to scientifically legitimize its political definition. What our psychological and psychopathological knowledge can be used for, as critical psychology and critical psychopathology, is to fulfill at least two crucial tasks for the explanation and understanding of fascist and neo-fascist normopathy. Let us pause for a moment, to conclude, on each of these tasks.

The first task, already partly accomplished, is the elucidation of the process by which a certain pathology, a certain psychopathy, becomes normalized and gives rise to the normopathic picture underlying fascism and neo-fascism. This process is already a fundamental form of fascistization involving mechanisms well studied in mainstream social psychology, such as the normalization of Muzafer Sherif,²³ the conformity of Solomon Asch,²⁴ the obedience of Stanley Milgram,²⁵ the proximity principle of Theodore Mead Newcomb²⁶ and the unconscious social influence of Serge Moscovici, Bernard Personnaz and others.²⁷ In studying how such mechanisms operate in a certain particular historical situation, we should try to clarify how they provoke a certain normopathic picture by influencing broad sectors of society and causing them to somehow lose their mental health, understanding health in the profound sense established by Georges Canguilhem, as a capacity to give oneself one's own norms for the benefit of life, as a vital normative capacity that is also a political capacity for the radical exercise of citizenship.²⁸

How is it possible that millions of subjects can renounce their normativity and submit themselves completely to the norms imposed on them to the point of **becoming sick with normality**? Will the resulting normopathy perhaps be favored by the great adaptability and marked conventionalism of the petty bourgeoisie that Leon Trotsky²⁹ and others associated with fascism? The resolution of these questions and many more may benefit from psychological research.

NORMOSIS AND NORMOPATHY

A second task of psychology, a task still pending, is the distinction between two opposing experiences of pathology of normality that are often confused and that we can identify, at least provisionally, as the normopathic and normotic pictures, taking up Christopher Bollas's term **normosis**,³⁰ but deepening and broadening its scope in the social and political field. If normopathy is a normalized or generalized psychopathy, normosis results from the generalization or normalization of a kind of neurosis. Just as the neurotic suffers his neurosis, in the same way the normotic suffers his normosis, being affected, hurt and tormented by it. The normosis causes him

pain and other forms of discomfort, anguishes him, makes him restless, depresses him, paralyzes him, disables him, makes him fail again and again in life, preventing him from living and enjoying what he lives. The normothic would be clearly distinguished from the normopath, who, like a psychopath, can enjoy his pathology, living it for his own benefit, exploit it to his advantage and at the expense of others.

Normopathy can be illustrated with the racists, sexists and classists of the ultra-right, but also with successful and joyful characters of our society such as corrupt officials, Machiavellian politicians, sadistic bureaucrats, unscrupulous businessmen or insatiable capitalists, among many others. These normopaths who enjoy our pathological normality should not be confused with normotics, those who suffer from it to unsuspected extremes, partly so that normopaths can enjoy it. The enjoyment of normopathy and the suffering of normosis are thus correlative phenomena.³¹

Why are some subjects willing to suffer from the normality that others enjoy? How do the paths of normopathy and normosis bifurcate? How does this bifurcation connect with the class division of capitalist society, with the gender division in heteropatriarchy, and with the cultural and racial divisions traced by colonialism, neocolonialism and coloniality?

Do the various systems of oppression differentially assign normotic and normopathic roles to subjects? Are these roles and the links between them predetermined by political, social, cultural and economic structures? For example, does an apartheid-like separation such as the one in Israel between Palestinians and Israelis somehow predispose the former to normosis and the latter to normopathy? What must happen for there to be equally normopaths in oppressed sectors and normotics in oppressor sectors? All these questions and many more can also be investigated in psychology.

CONCLUSION

Psychologists can contribute much to the study of the ultra-right, fascism and neo-fascism, Nazism and neo-Nazism. The value of our contributions will depend on our ability to unravel something new without exceeding a well-defined field of study. This will require us to consider the political as political, taking a position in it, but carefully refraining from psychologizing it and thus depoliticizing it.

It is not necessary to go outside of politics to justify our political position. This position contains its own justification which is also political and can only be political. It is only politically

that we can justify even an elementary option such as that, as anti-capitalist as it is anti-fascist, for life and against death.

By opting for life and by making this option guide our activity, we are undoubtedly demonstrating a health that can be conceived as such with Canguilhem's argumentation and that can justify our choice for it. However, beyond the psychological scenario, our major justification may be a rather redundant one: that of opting for health by normatively opting for life. This double option is political and only politically can it be justified against the opposite option for death, for fascism and for capitalism, for the capital that devours everything alive to transmute it into more and more dead money.

The deadly fascist and capitalist options, not being able to be refuted with rational arguments or scientific evidence, must be fought through militant anti-fascist and anti-capitalist political practice. This material practice is all we have against the option summarized in the famous Falangist slogan traditionally attributed to José Millán-Astray: "Long live death!"³² In the face of those who prefer death, the intelligence embodied by Miguel de Unamuno is of little use, but we can fight politically for life. It is obviously a matter of winning and not of convincing.

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